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• 
ECONOMIC DISEQUILIBRIA AND RURAL FINANCIAL 
MARKET PERFORMANCE IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES* 
Financial markets are expected to contribute to rural development 
in developing economies by improving the quantity and quality of rural 
savings, and by the provision of credit in amounts and forms that enhance 
productive capacity and rural equity. However, mounting evidence from 
many countries leads to the conclusion that rural financial markets 
are not fulfilling these expectations (See for example, Adams, 1979; 
Adams and Ladman, 1978; De Araujo and Meyer; Vogel; Ladman and 
Tinnermeir; and Desai). Financial savings have not grown significantly, 
and poor loan repayment performance and problems of funding have 
prevented the sustained growth of rural credit. Indeed, in several 
countries, such as Bangladesh, Ghana, and Jamaica, rural financial 
markets are in a state of acute depression or near collapse. 
Among the various approaches taken to diagnose the decline in the 
viability and performance of rural financial markets are in-depth 
analyses of specific programs and institutions. These studies invariably 
highlight the weakness of program design and managerial skills, inappro-
priate coordination with other policies, poorly defined or inconsistent 
objectives and, in general insufficient appreciation of the limits of 
the possible in trying to rapidly change or expand the size and composition 
of a credit program's portfolio with present managerial skills and 
resources. Policy recommendations emerging from these "intra-
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project" evaluations emphasize the need for innovations in deposit 
facilities and savings mobilization (Adams, 1978), better credit 
delivery systems (Adams and Ladman, 1979), through improved credit 
appraisal methods and more effective loan monitoring and loan recovery 
procedures (e.g. Gonzalez-Vega and Tinnermeir). Finally the need to 
institute more flexible interest rate policies, thereby reducing the 
wide gap between low lending rates and high lending costs is frequently 
advised (Adams, 1978; Datey). The net effect of these concerted 
efforts are expected to guarantee a viable self-sustaining set of 
financial programs contributing to the recovery of rural financial markets. 
For the most part these policy recommendations are based on 
sound diagnoses and their implementation called for. In a relatively 
healthy economy experiencing positive rates of growth, little to 
moderate inflation and relatively stable exchange rates and balanced 
trade, such "intra-project" reforms are both necessary and sufficient 
to secure a recuperation of rural financial institutions and programs. 
In this setting the potential for the recovery of rural financial markets 
is apparent. 
However, these approaches are unlikely to be adequate in situations 
of widespread and acute economic disequilibria. In these situations, 
the poor performance of the financial sector is conditioned by under-
lying problems in the real sector of the economy. In the latter circum-
stances financial sector reforms by themselves are too partial and 
narrow in focus. They are hardly sufficient conditions for the 
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recovery of rural financial markets when the general economic environment 
and related policy instruments exert much stronger influence on the 
success or failure of a credit project than specific intra-project 
reforms. 
We argue that macroeconomic disequilibria transmit 
themselves to rural financial markets through their effects on farm 
output, profits, and debt and savings capacity, as well as through 
their effects on debt service and amortization requirements. Careful 
consideration of these linkages is necessary for fuller understanding 
of the problems of rural financial markets and for the formulation of 
appropriate rural development policies. 
The paper begins by identifying some pertinent features of macro-
economic disorder in developing economies. Next, a simple model of the 
transmission mechanism is outlined, and applied to case material on the 
Jamaican economy to demonstrate the influence of macroeconomic 
disequilibria on Jamaica's rural financial market. Some conclusions 
are drawn in the final section. 
Pertinent Features of Macroeconomic Disorder 
Serious macroeconomic disorder in a developing economy may take 
one or more of the following forms. The economy typically experiences 
rapid rates of domestic price inflation. Price controls become 
increasingly ineffective in restraining the growth of consumer prices. 
Government subsidies fail to maintain a restraining influence because 
the inflation erodes the purchasing power of government itself. 
However, domestic agricultural prices tend not to rise as rapidly as 
' 
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the general level of prices, since governments for sociopolitical reasons 
adopt price controls and food import policies to prevent the full 
upward adjustment of domestic food prices. Consequently, domestic food 
producers tend to experience a deterioration in their terms of trade. 
To the extent that exogeneously determined export agricultural prices 
rise more slowly than domestic prices, export producers also experience 
declines in their terms of trade. 
Factor costs also tend to escalate. Money wage rates respond to 
consumer prices with a lag, the length of which depends on the degree 
and strength of unionization. While the domestic foodstuffs subsector 
is significantly less unionized than ·the non-agricultural sectors, 
workers in export agriculture are highly unionized. A wage spread or 
spillover mechanism links wage rates in the two agricultural subsectors 
such that the unionized wage rate in the export subsector "pulls up" the 
nonunionized wage rate for domestic agriculture. The price of capital 
services will also tend to rise if severe balance of payments pressure 
results in exchange rate devaluation which increases the import prices 
of agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, chemicals, and machinery, 
or in quantitative restrictions on imports which by creating supply 
shortages drive up local supply prices. Government subsidies on chemical or 
other inputs might also be reduced. The user cost of capital services 
will consequently tend to rise in this disequilibrium situation. 
Quantitative restrictions on imports tend to be utilized as an 
instrument of balance of payments correction (e.g. Krueger). Quanti-
tative restrictions on imports of producer goods, in the face of inelastic 
domestic supplies, result in reduced availabilities of those goods. 
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The agricultural sector is affected to the extent that the restrictions 
apply to its range of producer goods. In practice, supplies of modern 
agricultural inputs are adversely affected by extensive quantitative 
restrictions on imports. 
Nominal interest rates tend to increase as financial institutions 
attempt to defend their profit rates against rising factor costs. 
Short run rigidity in deposit costs, resulting from contractual time 
deposit arrangements, would ensure that loan rates would be defensively 
raised by commercial lending institutions. 
Finally, acute deterioration in the country's balance of inter-
national payments ultimately forces the adoption of stabilization programs 
formulated with the assistance of multilateral agencies, notably the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. The stabilization programs usually incorporate 
provisions for sizable exchange rate devaluation and for monetary and 
credit restraint (Maynard and Bird; Kafka; Reichman and Stillson). 
Characteristic of the later stages of serious economic disorder, therefore, 
are devaluation-induced increases in the local currency value of debt 
denominated in foreign currency, and policy determined contractions in 
credit supply. 
A Simple Model of the Transmission Mechanism 
The effects of severe macroeconomic disorder on rural financial 
markets are transmitted through changes in farm savings and debt 
transactions induced by the rising costs of farm production and consumption 
relative to agricultural product prices. The following simple model 
illustrates the main aspects of the transmission mechanism. 
' 
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Assume that farm operations can be described by the following 
set of production, profits, income-expenditure, and debt relationships. 
Farm output is represented by .the linear production function: 
(1) 
where Q is output per acre, K is capital services inclusive of planting 
materials and chemicals per acre, and N is labor per acre. The fi are 
production coefficients. 
The farm's gross profits relationship is: 
where Y is gross profits, p1 is product price, Pz is the cost of 
capital services, and p3 is the money wage rate. 
(2) 
This specification of the gross prof its function implicitly 
assumes that there are no factor payments for land. Although in 
practice some form of rental arrangement may exist, we simplify by 
assuming that farmers own the land they cultivate. It is also assumed 
that family labor is incorporated in N and is paid at the market wage 
rate, p3 • 
The cost of capital services is susceptible to quite complex 
expressions depending on the assumptions made about the rate of capital 
stock depreciation, income taxes, and discount rates. In its simplest 
form, the user cost of capital can be expressed as the price of capital 
goods. In developing economies, two main determinants of capital good 
prices would be the local currency cost of imported capital goods and the 
degree of quantity rationing. Quantity rationing creates excess demand 
pressures which tend to drive prices up. 
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Gross profits are used for tax payments, T, debt service and 
amortization, D, farm consumption, C, and savings, S. It is assumed 
that the sole tax levied on farmers is a flat annual charge per acre 
of land owned. Tax payments are therefore a fixed charge on gross 
profits. It is also asstnned that farmers treat farm consumption as a 
first order claim on gross income. These two assumptions imply that 
actual debt payments and savings are residually determined: 
D + S = Y - T - C 
The farm's demand for debt ( td) is hypothesized to vary 
negatively with current farm gross income, positively with expected 
gross income, negatively with the interest cost of credit, i, and 
negatively with the amount of own financial resources, i.e., S: 
Ld = L(Y, ye,i;S) 
(3) 
(4) 
The negative relationship between actual income and credit demand is 
rationalized on the grounds that the greater the farm's net cash flow 
the lower the liquidity demand for credit. The expected income variable 
is justified on traditional accelerator and expected profits grounds. 
Finally, the farm satisfies the balance sheet condition that 
total assets must equal total liabilities: 
S +A= L 
where A is accumulated assets at time t. 
(5) 
To complete the model, one needs to specify the price relationships. 
Consistent with the earlier discussion of the macroeconomy, farm product 
prices are assumed to be determined as follows: 
(6) 
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where wi are weights for the share of domestic agriculture and export 
agriculture in total agricultural output. g is the fixed coefficient 
less than unity which government applies to the overall price level, P, 
to determine domestic agricultural prices. P is the exogeneously 
x 
determined local currency price of agricultural exports. 1 
The cost of capital services is directly related to the local 
currency price of imports, Pm' and the degree of quantity restriction, R. 
The wage rate is a direct function of the overall price level: 
p = bP 3 
(7) 
(8) 
The overall level of prices itself is determined by import prices and 
by the level of excess aggregate demand: 
(9) 
where ED is excess demand. 
Finally, the price of credit is the rate of interest, r, adjusted 
for changes in the capital value of the debt: 
i = r + k (10) 
where k is the percentage change in the capital value of debt. 
By combining equations (1), (2), and (6) to (9), and differentiating 
gross profits with respect to the general price level, one can identify 
the effects of price inflation on gross farm profits 
dY 
dP 
(11) 
' 
It can be seen that the effects of general price inflation on 
gross profits depends on the input-output coefficients fi, the 
government agricultural pricing rate, g, the share of domestic 
agricultural output, w1 , and the wage-price coefficien~, b. If the 
input-output relationships and domestic agriculture's share are 
unchanged, then domestic price inflation will depress profits if adjust-
ment is fuller for wages than for domestic agricultural prices. 
It can be shown that dY/dpm = -a1K < 0. Thus import price inflation 
operating through the price of agricultural capital goods increases the 
cost of capital services and depresses profits. Quantity restrictions 
also depress profits since dY/dR = a 2K < O, and through the reduced 
availability of capital services for production. 
Recognizing that the money value of consumption increases with 
the rate of inflation, given fixed real consumption targets, domestic 
price inflation increases C in this model. 
Altogether, therefore, price trends and import restraints reduce 
the availability of incomes for debt payments and savings. Lower levels 
of farm savings impinge negatively on the flow of loanable funds into 
those rural financial institutions which mobilize rural surpluses. This 
is one adverse consequence of severe economic disorder for rural financial 
market performance. Another is the growing delinquency and loan default 
caused by the depressing effects of general and factor price inflation 
on debt service and amortization capacity. 
Paradoxically, the ability to service debt is reduced at times 
when the stabilization program increases debt service requirements by 
' 
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raising the interest rate, r, and the local currency value of loans 
provided out of foreign currency resources. The change in local currency 
value of debt would tend to be significant for that segment of rural 
financial markets made up of public sector specialized credit agencies, 
funded largely by loans from foreign governments and multilateral 
agencies. 
On examination of the demand for credit function, one would 
predict that farm demand for credit is reduced by domestic consumer 
and factor price inflation which adversely affect profit expectations and · 
by the rising cost of credit occasioned by the stabilization program. 
However, there are also pressures in the opposite direction. The 
liquidity demand for credit is increased by the fall in current 
profits and current savings. The net outcome on credit demand would 
depend on the relative strength of these two sets of tendencies. 
If the credit stabilization program is effective, export credit supply 
would tend to be lower, a tendency that would itself be strengthened 
by the loan-capacity depressing effects of reduced levels of savings. 
On balance, it can be concluded on theoretical grounds that, 
by impacting negatively on farm savings, debt creation, and debt 
payments, severe macroeconomic disorder is likely to exert a depressing 
effect on rural financial markets in developing economies. 
Jamaican Rural Financial Market Depression 
The Jamaican economy provides excellent case material for applying 
the principles developed in the preceding section~ The economy 
' 
-11-
collapsed from a situation of positive growth of real gross domestic 
product averaging 5 percent during 1965 to 1972 to an uninterrupted 
succession of annual negative growth rates ranging from 1 to 8 percent 
between 1974 and 1978. Prolonged balance of payments problems, 
manifested by a movement from net foreign reserves of J$132 million 
in 1971 to minus J$196 million in 1977, resulted in increasingly 
severe corrective policies of quantitative restrictions on imports, 
exchange rate devaluations totaling 54 percent between 1970 and 1978, 
and domestic credit restraint. The economy is heavily reliant on 
imports for its supply of consumer and producer goods, with imports 
averaging 41 percent of gross national expenditure over the period. 
Consequently, domestic prices are highly responsive to changes in 
import prices. The rate of inflation has risen sharply, averaging 15 
percent during the 1970s, and was as high as 27 percent in 1978. 
Labor is highly unionized in all productive sectors, excluding domestic 
agriculture. Wage rates have generally kept pace with domestic price 
inflation. 
On all counts, severe macroeconomic disorder typifies the 
Jamaican economy in the 1970s. The poor performance of the real sector 
was accompanied by serious problems within the financial sector, 
including the rural financial market. The rural financial market will 
now be briefly described, and its depression indexed. 3 
The institutional complex that comprises the Jamaican rural 
financial market includes eight commercial banks operating a country-
wide network of branches, and two specialized government-owned credit 
' 
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agencies, namely the Jamaica Development Bank and the Agricultural Credit 
Board. Cormnercial banks are the largest single source of credit as well 
as the main savings institutions. The Agricultural Credit Board is a 
non-deposit taking institution established solely for the purpose of 
making direct loans to large farmers and institutional loans to the 
national network of People's Cooperative Banks, which in turn make 
small loans to small farmers. The People's Cooperative Banks also 
mobilize rural savings but on a very small scale. The Jamaica Development 
Bank, established in 1969, is funded mainly through capital subscriptions 
and loans from the Jamaican Government and from loans from foreign aid 
agencies. The Jamaica Development Bank operates a commercial loan 
window for medium to large farmers and, through an affiliated agency 
i.e. the Self-Supporting Farmers Development Program, maintains a loan 
facility for small to medium sized farmers. The Ministry of Agriculture 
provides rural credit services under several ad hoc programs, the most 
recent and important being the Crop Lien Program launched in 1977 to 
provide production loans to domestic foodcrop producers. Other financial 
institutions, such as building societies and life insurance companies, 
and informal groups such as rotating credit associations and credit unions 
complete the institutional structure of the rural financial market in 
Jamaica. While the rural savings and credit activities of the latter set 
of transactors cannot be precisely quantified, it does appear that most 
of rural savings and credit are channelled through the commercial banks 
and specialized government programs. The ensuing discussion of rural 
financial market depression is focused on the commercial banks, the 
Jamaica Development Bank and the Self Supporting Farmers Development Program. 
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Three pertinent indicators of financial market performance are the 
behaviour of savings, credit, and loan repayments. Time series estimates 
of rural savings in Jamaica are not available. However, the behaviour 
of conunercial bank total savings and time deposits provides some insight 
into the trends in rural savings mobilization. Real savings and time 
deposits after rising from J$223 million in 1970 to J$298 million in 
1972, declined by 18 percent over the next two years, recovered slightly 
in 1975 and 1976, only to decline by roughly 7 percent in 1977. Overall, 
real savings at commercial banks stagnated from 1973 to 1978 (Table 1, 
Col. 1). Therefore, it can be inferred that the savings side of the 
Jamaican rural financial market did not perform well during this period. 
Rural credit, having expanded rapidly early in the 1970s, tended 
to decline after 1974. The time series of rural credit in Table 1 
shows that the annual growth rate of credit (measured in constant 1970 
prices) fell, negative growth being experienced in 1974 and dramatically 
so in 1978 (Column 4). The large percentage increase in 1975 is mainly 
a statistical artifact caused by officially reclassifying as "agricultural" 
many commercial bank loans which were previously classified as non-
agricultural. The series on the ratio of rural credit to agricultural 
gross domestic product at factor cost exhibits the same pattern as the 
dollar values of rural credit, i.e. a rise and then a decline (Table 1, 
Column 5). 
Loan repayment data is not available for a sufficient number of 
years to permit similar trend analyses for loan repayment performance. 
However, the available information reveals a very unsatisfactory 
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situation in 1977 and 1978 (Graham, Bourne, Begashaw). The ratio of 
arrears to payments due on Jamaica Development Bank commercial window 
loans reached system collapse levels of 81 and 83 percent in 1977 and 
1978 respectively. The arrears ratio for the Self Supporting Farmers 
Development Program was as high as 38 percent ~n 1978. The commercial 
banks, largely because of their more stringent loan appraisal and 
recovery practices and their early write-off policy for bad debt, 
managed to keep their arrears ratio down to 4 percent in 1978. However, 
commercial banks did experience serious repayment problems. Their 
allowances for losses and bad debts as a proportion of total current 
operating expenses rose from an average of 4 percent between 1970 to 
1975 to 6 percent between 1976 and 1977, and even higher to 11 percent 
4 
in 1978. While these statistics on commercial bank performance do not 
pertain to agricultural loans exclusively, one may infer from these 
data that commercial banks, like the public sector credit agencies, 
were experiencing difficulties in recovering rural loans. 
The evidence on savings mobilization, credit, and loan repayment 
leads inescapably to the conclusion that Jamaican rural financial 
markets were very depressed in the 1970s, particularly in the latter 
half of the decade. Graham, Bourne and Begashaw have demonstrated 
that weaknesses in the design, implementation, and monitoring of rural 
credit programs explain much of this poor performance. However, these 
factors operating on the supply side, i.e. financial institutional 
side, do not fully account for the dismal experience. Events within 
the agricultural sector and within the overall economy seriously affected 
1 
1 
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the demand side, i.e. the farm household side of the rural financial 
market, in ways that contributed to the difficulties experienced 
within the rural financial sector. The importance of these more general 
influences will now be demonstrated. 
The Influence of Macroeconomic Disorder 
It can be shown that the price behaviour of the economy contributed 
to the debt' repayment problems experienced by Jamaican farmers. 
Selected price data are presented in Table 2. Examining first the 
series for the consumer price index and the Gross Domestic Product 
deflator, it can be seen that domestic price inflation was rapid, 
averaging between 15 and 17 percent per annum during the decade. On the 
basis of the wage-price relationship prevailing in this economy, one 
could infer that agricultural wage rates along with other wage rates 
rose rapidly in response to the inflation of consumer prices. Annual 
wage settlements for all sectors of the economy during the period 1971 
to 1976 ranged between 18 and 45 percent. 5 Economy-wide labor incomes 
per worker increased annually by an average of 18 percent. Agricultural 
incomes kept pace with the economy-wide trends. While no details are 
available on agricultural wage rates specifically, it is clear that 
per worker compensation of employees in the agricultural sector rose 
significantly (Table 2, Column 3), exceeding the national rate of 
increase of income per worker in 1975 and 1978. To some extent, the 
annual rate of increase since 1976 was restrained by the growing 
share of government sector agricultural employees in total agricultural 
employment. Since wage rate increases were slower for government 
' 
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employees, the composite index indicates slower rates of increases than 
actually obtained for privately employed agricultural workers. 
The price of capital services also increased significantly over 
the period. The import price index (Table 2, Column 4) rose by an 
average of 23 percent per annum. It can be seen that the annual 
increases were particularly large in 1973, 1974, 1977 and 1978. 
Substantial exchange rate devaluations occurred in the first and last 
two of these four years, while in 1974 OPEC raised petroleum prices 
substantially. Further, more direct support for the contention that 
the price of capital services increased greatly is provided by the 
data on unit prices of imported chemical fertilizers (Table 2, Column 5). 
The annual increases averaged 28 percent, and in 1974 more than 
doubled, again largely as a result of OPEC's impact on the price of 
petroleum and petroleum-based products. It can be concluded, therefore, 
that the price of capital services depressed gross agricultural profits. 
These factor price trends do not appear to have been offset by 
increases in farm productivity. In the export sector, the index of 
tons of cane harvested per acre declined almost continuously from 100 
in 1970 to 85 in 1977 (Table 3, Column 5). Productivity per acre in 
domestic agriculture remained roughly the same from 1971 to 1976, 
but seems to have risen significantly in 1977 and 1978 (Table 3, 
Column 6). 
Quantitative restrictions also reduced farm profits. Import 
licensing became increasingly widespread and severe, with consequent 
reductions in the availability of producer goods. For example, 
Table 2, Column 6 shows that the quantity index of fertilizer imports 
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declined during the decade. The smaller supplies of improved inputs 
must have adversely affected production and productivity, and thereby 
farm revenues. The index of domestic food crop production declined 
slightly from 149 in 1972 and did not regain that level again until 
1977 and 1978 when the massive governmental credit and physical support 
under the Emergency Production Plan succeeded in raising the index to 
180 and 228 respectively (Table 3, Column 4). During this period, output 
decreased for the major agricultural export commodities, i.e. sugar 
and bananas by between 33 and 42 percent, and for quantitatively minor 
export commodities such as coffee (Table 3, Columns 1, 2, 3). 
Given these adverse trends in factor prices, output, and produc-
tivity, it is necessary to examine the behaviour of. agricultural 
commodity prices. Data on agricultural exports and farm-gate prices 
are summarized in Table 4. From Columns 1 and 2, it can be deduced 
that export prices rose on average more slowly than factor prices, 
adjusted for productivity declines. For instance, average annual 
percentage increases in the export prices of sugar and bananas, the 
two main export crops, were 20 and 18 percent respectively compared 
to an average annual price increase of 28 percent for fertilizers. 
Domestic agriculture seems to have fared no better. Column 3 reports 
an average annual percentage increase of 20 percent for domestic 
farm-gate prices. It should be noted that farm-gate prices actually 
declined in 1978. 
The preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that the increases 
in product prices did not totally offset increases in factor prices, 
' 
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nor production and productivity declines. Consequently gross profits 
were seriously squeezed. Direct evidence on profits reinforces this 
conclusion. The National Income and Product Accounts provide data on 
a reasonable proxy for profits, namely real operating surplus defined 
as value added minus net labor, tax, and capital consumption expenditures. 
Table 4, Column 4 reveals that the real operating surplus of the agri-
cultural sector declined in 1974, 1975, and 1978. In other words, 
agricultural gross profits were indeed reduced by the prevailing macro-
economic disorder. 
The lower levels of gross income flows occurred at times when 
price trends in the economy increased the money value of farm household 
purchases. Unless farmers were willing to accept substantially lower 
real levels of consumption, the rapid rate of consumer price inflation 
would result in larger money allocations to farm household consumption. 
No data is presently available on farm consumption expenditures 
specifically. However, the National Accounts data reveal that aggregate 
real private consumption expenditures did not fall until 1977 and 
1978 when decreases of 4 and 10 percent were recorded. Most likely, 
farm families shared that experience. 
It has been argued so far that the macroeconomic disequilibria 
via product and factor prices, output, and productivity contributed 
to rural financial market depression by substantially reducing the 
capacity of farmers to save, make profitable investments, and to repay 
debt. It will now be shown that debt service and amortization require-
ments also increased. 
-19-
Commercial banks increased their loan rates of interest in an 
attempt to moderate the decline in net earnings caused by lower volumes 
of lending. On average, their nominal loan rates during 1974 to 
1978 were three index points higher than rates in the 1970 to 1974 
period (Bank of Jamaica Annual Report). Loan charges of public sector 
credit agencies remained the same (Graham, Bourne, Begashaw). However, 
given the large share of commercial banks in rural credit, overall 
rural loan rates of interest were pulled upwards. 
Furthermore, frequent exchange rate devaluations, totalling 
54 percent between 1970 and 1978, increased the local currency value 
of debt financed from foreign funds. Farmers are required to maintain 
the foreign currency values of such loans made by the Jamaica Development 
Bank. Consequently, exchange rate devaluation abruptly increases the 
local currency costs of these debts. Foreign funds comprised between 
33 and 67 percent of loans extended by the Jamaica Development Bank 
during the period 1970 to 1978. Farm credit extended by other insti-
tutions are not based on foreign funds and consequently have been 
unaffected by the recent devaluations. Nonetheless, given the share 
of the Jamaica Development Bank program in the total supply of rural 
credit, a substantial proportion of farm debt must have been adversely 
affected. 
Conclusion 
The central thesis of this article is that severe macroeconomic 
disequilibria and its adverse effects on the agricultural sector are 
major reasons for the poor performance of rural financial markets in 
' 
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developing economies. Failure to recognize the implications of general 
economic performance for the behavior of the rural economy and rural 
financial markets can result in policies that are directed only towards 
financial institutions. However, policies aimed at improving credit 
delivery, loan appraisal, and loan monitoring systems are too partial 
in scope to compensate for the more fundamental problems created by 
widespread disequilibria in product and factor markets and by balance 
of payments corrective policies. It is only by explicitly taking 
account of the general equilibrium framework in which rural financial 
markets function that effective policies can be devised. 
The theoretical and empirical analysis in this paper demonstrates 
that the systematic application of even a very simple transmission 
model, which focuses on key production, price and expenditure relationships 
can contribute towards the formulation of appropriate policies. In 
the Jamaican case, the evidence strongly supports the contention that 
the poor performance of rural financial markets towards the end of the 
1970s results substantially from serious macroeconomic disequilibria 
in that economy. It follows, then, that any successful program for 
improving the performance of those markets must include policies for 
general price and exchange rate stability. Only then can an appropriate 
balance between farm revenues and expenditures, including credit costs 
be restored. Without such a balance, rural financial markets are 
unlikely to perform effectively and efficiently. 
" 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
~ 1976 
1977 
1978 
Source: 
Notes: 
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Table 1 
Indicators of Financial Market Performance 
in Jamaica, 1971-78 
Real Savings 
and Time Deposits Ratio of Real 
in Commercial Real Rural to Agric. 
Banks1 Credit2 Rural GDP at Factor Cost 
$M %b. $M %b. Ratio 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
256 15 29 13 .33 
298 16 32 12 .35 
280 - 6 37 15 .44 
245 -12 35 - 6 .41 
257 5 56 60 .64 
262 2 61 10 .73 
244 - 7 65 7 .73 
258 5 43 -35 .44 
Column 1 computed from data in Bank of Jamaica Statistical 
Digest. Column 3 computed from data in Jamaica Development 
Bank annual reports and files, and Jamaica Dept. of Statistics 
Monetary Statistics; column 5 from National Income and Product 
1. Money values are deflated by Implicit GDP deflator, 
1970 = 100. 
2. Rural Credit is the sum of agricultural loans outstanding 
by commercial banks, the Jamaica Development Bank, the 
Agricultural Credit Board, the Self-Supporting Farmers 
Development Program, and the Crop Lien Program, deflated 
by the Implicit GDP deflator, 1970 = 100. 
%b. 
(6) 
5 
8 
24 
- 6 
56 
14 
0 
-39 
Accounts. 
' 
' 
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Table 2 
Annual Percentage Changes in General Prices, 
Input Costs, and Input Supply for Jamaica, 1971-78 
Income 
Per Worker Unit Import Quantity Index 
Consumer GDP Total Import Price of for Imported 
Year Prices Def la tor Econom;:r Agric. Prices Fertilizers Fertilizers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) (6) ( 7) 
1971 6.7 6.7 n.a. n. a. 19.l 32.5 46.0 
1972 5.8 5.8 n.a. n. a. - 1.0 26.8 20.3 
1973 19.9 17.6 18.4 12.0 31.4 8.8 49.2 
1974 20.6 27.3 45.6 25.3 45.8 132. 0 -11.3 
1975 15.7 17.4 16.9 39.3 11. 7 0.9 15.l 
1976 8.1 9.7 4.5 3.4 5.4 - 47.6 - 6.1 
1977 14.0 11. 2 8.2 6.6 28.8 41.9 -22.6 
1978 49.3 27.1 14.4 22.2 44.5 44.6 - 4.2 
AVG. 17.5 15.3 18.0 18.1 23.2 27.8 - 0.7 
Source: Column 1 computed from data in Bank of Jamaica Statistical 
Bulletin. Remaining columns computed from data in Jamaica 
Dept. of Statistics External Trade Reports, National Income 
and Product Accounts, and The Labor Force. 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
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Table 3 
Indices of Jamaican Agricultural Output and Productivity, 
Selected Crops 1971-78 
Sugar Bananas 
(1) (2) 
100 100 
102 94 
101 95 
88 80 
99 53 
96 52 
98 59 
78 60 
77 58 
(1970 = 100) 
Output 
Coffee 
(3) 
100 
97 
82 
56 
17 
27 
4 
125 
72 
Domestic 
Food Crops 
(4) 
100 
141 
149 
136 
148 
149 
146 
180 
228 
Land Productivity 
Sugar 
Cane 
( 5) 
100 
95 
92 
91 
90 
84 
87 
85 
94 
Domestic 
Food Crops 
(6) 
100 
107 
105 
107 
109 
114 
107 
119 
121 
Source: Columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 computed from data in annual Jamaica 
Economic and Social Survey (National Planning Unit); Column 4 
and 6 computed from data in Ministry of Agriculture Indices of 
Domestic Agricultural Production and Farm Gate Prices, various 
years; and Jamaica Department of Statistics Statistical 
Yearbook of Jamaica, 1978. 
~ Year 
• 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
' 
1977 
1978 
AVG. 
Source: 
• 
-24-
Table 4 
Annual Percentage Changes in Agricultural Product Prices 
and Agricultural Operating Surpluses for Jamaica, 1971-78 
Export Export 
Price of Price of Farm-Gate 
Sugar Bananas Prices 
(1) (2) (3) 
3.0 6.0 22.8 
22.3 0 1.9 
11.1 62.3 36.6 
31.4 4.6 32.7 
100.0 35.5 26.1 
- 56.0 -27.9 8.4 
31.6 43.7 35.3 
n.a. n.a. - 1.6 
20.4 17.7 20.3 
Real 
Gross 
Profits 
(4) 
23.6 
2.4 
7.3 
- 4.8 
- 3.9 
1.1 
5.7 
- 8.0 
2.9 
Columns 1 and 2 computed from data in Bank of Jamaica Balance 
of Payments Accounts; Column 3 from Ministry of Agriculture 
Indices of Domestic Agricultural Production and Farm-Gate 
Prices; and Column 4 from Dept. of Statistics National Income • 
and Product Accounts • 
' 
• 
' 
• 
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Notes 
* We gratefully acknowledge the advice of Dale W Adams and Robert C. Vogel. 
1 A practical, but for present purposes unncessary, refinement would 
be to express export prices paid to farmers as a proportion of the 
prices received by centralized export marketing agencies. 
2 The empirical evidence in this paragraph is based on data series 
obtainable from three official publications, namely: Jamaica 
Department of Statistics National Income and Product ~ccounts, 
Bank of Jamaica Annual Report, Bank of Jamaica Statistical Digest. 
3 Graham, Bourne, and Begashaw contain a fuller description and 
analysis. 
4 These computations are based on costs and earnings data published 
in Jamaica Department of Statistics Monetary Statistics, 1978. 
5 These data, reported in Bank of Jamaica Annual Reports, include wage 
awards which, though approved in a given year, pertain to union wage 
contracts of more than one year duration. In such cases, the 
settlements recorded overstate the actual wage increase for that 
year. 
• 
• 
' 
• 
1. 
2 . 
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